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Abstract: This paper reports the effort of deducing the initial strategy distributions of agents in mix-game model 
which is used to predict a real financial time series generated from a target financial market. Using mix-game to 
predict Shanghai Index, we find the time series of prediction accurate rates is sensitive to the initial strategy 
distributions of agents in group 2 who play minority game, but less sensitive to the initial strategy distributions 
of agents in group 1 who play majority game. And agents in group 2 tend to cluster in full strategy space (FSS) if 
the real financial time series has obvious tendency (upward or downward), otherwise they tend to scatter in FSS. 
We also find that the initial strategy distributions and the number of agents in group 1 influence the level of 
prediction accurate rates. Finally, this paper gives suggestion about further research.  
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1. Introduction 
Forecasting financial markets is a continuous effort of researchers, and attracts great attention of practitioners. 
The use of agent-based models to forecast financial markets is a new attempt in this area. Neil F. Johnson etc. 
reported on a technique based on multi-agent games which has potential use in predicting future movements of 
financial time-series. In their articles, minority game (MG) [1] is trained on a real financial time series, and then 
run into the future to extract next step and multi-step predictions [2, 3, 4]. In order to improve the forecasting 
accurate rate, C. Gou used mix-game [5, 6] to predict Shanghai Index. She found that using mix-game can 
improve forecasting accurate rate at least 3% more than using minority game and the forecasting accurate rate is 
sensitive to the initial strategy distributions of agents [7]. The initial strategy distribution (ISD) is distributed 
randomly in full strategy space and kept unchangeable during the game. Since the environment of a financial 
market is changeable, agents in the market need to adjust their strategies to survive in the market. For the 
purpose of prediction, we also need to tune the ISD of mix-game model so as to get a good accurate rate of 
prediction, i.e. agents in mix-game model need to change their strategies. Therefore, understanding what factors 
influence the accurate rates of prediction and how agents in mix-game move in their strategy spaces is important 
for predicting a financial time series. In order to do so, this paper looks at the backward question that we try to 
deduce the strategy distributions of agents in their strategy spaces in mix-game according to a real financial time 
series. 
This paper is organized as following. Section 2 introduces the model and the methodology of deducing the 
strategy distributions of agents. Section 3 reports the results and discussion. Section 4 gives the conclusion. 
2. The model and the methodology  
2.1 Mix-game model 
Since mix-game model is an extension of minority game [1], its structure is similar to MG. In mix-game, 
there are two groups of agents; group 1 plays the majority game, and group 2 plays the minority game. N (odd 
number) is the total number of the agents, and N1 is number of agents in group 1. The system resource is 
R=0.5*N. All agents compete in the system for the limited resource R. T1 and T2 are the time horizon lengths of 
the two groups, and m1 and m2 denote the history memories of the two groups, respectively.   
The global information only available to agents is a common bit-string “memory” of the m1 or m2 most 
recent competition outcomes (1 or 0). A strategy consists of a response, i.e., 0 (sell) or 1 (buy), to each possible 
history bit string; hence there are 
122
m
or 
222
m
possible strategies for group 1 or group 2, respectively, which 
form full strategy spaces (FSS). At the beginning of the game, each agent is assigned s strategies and keeps them 
unchangeable during the game. After each turn, agents assign one virtual point to a strategy which would have 
predicted the correct outcome. For agents in group 1, they reward their strategies one point if they are in the 
majority side. In contrast, for agents in group 2, they reward their strategies one point if they are in the minority 
side. Agents collect the virtual points for their strategies over the time horizon T1 or T2, and they use their 
strategies which have the highest virtual point in each turn. If there are two strategies which have the highest 
virtual point, agents use coin toss to decide which strategy to be used. Excess demand is equal to the number of 
ones (buy) which agents choose minus the number of zeros (sell) which agents choose. According to a widely 
accepted assumption that excess demand exerts a force on the price of the asset and the change of price is 
proportion to the excess demand in a financial market, the time series of the price can be calculated based on the 
time series of the excess demand [8, 9]. 
2.2 Prediction method 
We use mix-game model to do one-step direction prediction about a real financial time series generated by a 
target financial market, whose dynamics are well-described by a mix-game model for a unknown parameter 
configuration of T1, T2, m1, m2, N, N1 and an unknown specific realization of initial strategy choices (ISD). After 
we select the parameter configuration for mix-game model, we use it to predict the time series generated by the 
target financial market. Fig.1 shows the work chart for prediction.  
  
Fig.1 work chart for prediction 
In the mix-game model, agents receive the global information which is strings of 1's and 0's (Wex) digitized 
from the real financial time series produced by the target financial market other than that (Win) generated by the 
mix-game model itself, and agents also reward their strategies according to the real financial time series (Wex). 
In order to see the performances of the mix-game model, we compare the time series generated by mix-game 
with the real financial time series produced by the target financial market, i.e. we compare Win with Wex since 
we just predict the directions. If they match, the mix-game model gets one point; if not, it gets zero. This point is 
referred to as accurate scores. Before prediction, we use real market data of time-step T3 to train the mix-game 
model. We calculate the accurate rate at every time-step according to the following formula: 
Accurate rate (current time) = accurate scores (current time, counted within T4)/ T4    (1), 
where T4 is a time window within which we count the accurate scores and this time window moves along the real 
financial time series so that we can get a time series of prediction accurate rates. After finishing the total 
predicting turns, we calculate the accumulated accurate rate which is equal to total accurate scores divided by 
total predicting turns, i.e.  
A target financial market 
Real financial time series 
Wex=sign (real financial time series ) 
Mix-game model 
Time series 
Win=sign (time series) 
Accurate scores 
Accumulated accurate rate = total accurate scores/ total prediction turns     (2). 
2.3 Method for deduction of strategy distributions of agents 
First we need to select a proper parameter configuration for modeling the target financial market. According 
to reference [5], the mix-game model with some parameter configurations reproduces the stylized features of 
financial time series. Therefore, we need to choose parameters of m1, m2, T1, T2, N and N1 when using mix-game 
to model financial markets. To do so, the following aspects need to be considered. 
z First make sure the time series of mix-game can reproduce the stylized facts of price time series of 
financial markets by choosing proper parameters: m1<m2=6, T1<T2 , N1/N<0.5; 
z Second pay attention to the fluctuation of local volatilities, and ensure that the median of local 
volatilities of mix-game is similar to that of the target time series; 
z Third make sure the log-log plot of absolute returns look similar. 
Second, we divide the time series of the real financial time series into several pieces. For each piece of time 
series, we use simple generic algorithm to search for the best ISD of agents by which the model can give the best 
prediction for this piece of real financial time series [7]. Therefore, we can see how the strategy distributions of 
agents change along the real financial time series. Usually we need to adjust T1, T2 and N1 in order to get high 
prediction accurate rate during this process. 
3. Results and discussions 
As an example, we use the above methodology to deduce the strategy distributions of agents in mix-game 
which is used to game to predict Shanghai Index dating from 02-07-2002 to 19-03-2004, as shown in Fig.2. We 
can see that there are downward tendency, upward tendency and balance states in the time series shown in Fig.2. 
So this period of Shanghai Index is a typical example for study. According to reference [5], we get one 
configuration of parameters of mix-game for simulation of Shanghai Index which is m1=3, m2=6, T1=12, T2=60, 
N=201, N1=40, s=2. 
 
Fig.2 Shanghai Index daily data from 02-07-2002 to 19-03-2004. 
A strategy is a response, i.e., 0 (sell) or 1 (buy), to each possible history bit string. Hence, we can turn the 
strategy into an integer value and plot it, and the integer value goes from zero to ( 12
12 −m ) or ( 12 22 −m ) for 
group 1 or group 2, respectively. Since each agent has 2 strategies, it is possible to illustrate ISD in a 2D-figure, 
as shown in Fig.3a where x-axis represents ‘strategy R’ and y-axis represents ‘strategy R`’ so that any point in 
this figure represents 2 strategies which one agent holds and all points in this figure form the initial strategy 
distribution（ISD）. Following the method as mentioned in section 2, we deduce the ISDs of the mix-game model 
according to the real financial time series shown in Fig.2. By analyzing these ISDs, we can get to know what 
factors influence the accurate rates of prediction and how agents move in their strategy spaces. 
3.1 What factors influence the accurate rates of prediction? 
In reference [7], C. Gou found that prediction accurate rates are sensitive to ISD. However, there are two 
ISDs in mix-game: ISD1 is the strategy distribution of group 1; ISD2 is the strategy distribution of group 2. So 
the question is the prediction accurate rate is sensitive to both ISD1 and ISD2 or just any of them. To look at this 
issue, we did simulations with three different ISD1 but the same ISD2_a in which all agents have the same 
strategies.  Fig.3a, Fig.4a and Fig.5a show the three different ISD1 with N1=90, m 1=3: all agents in group 1 have 
different strategies in ISD1_a_1 (Fig.3a); all agents in group 1 have the same strategies in ISD1_a_2 (Fig.4a); at 
least two agents in group 1 have the same strategies in ISD1_a_3 (Fig.5a).   
  The time series of prediction accurate rates of mix-game are shown in Fig.3b for initial strategy 
distributions of ISD1_a_1 and ISD2_a, Fig.4b for initial strategy distributions of ISD1_a_2 and ISD2_a and 
Fig.5b for initial strategy distributions of ISD1_a_3 and ISD2_a, respectively. Comparing these three figures, we 
can find these three time series of the prediction accurate rates of mix-game for Shanghai Index dating from 
02-07-2002 to 19-03-2004 look similar despite of the obvious difference of their ISD1. This implies that the time 
series of prediction accurate rates is mainly influenced by ISD2. That is to say, the time series of prediction 
accurate rates are more sensitive to ISD2, but less sensitive to ISD1. A possible explanation for this observation is 
that the characteristics of minority game dominants in mix-game if N1/N<0.5 and agents in group 1 are just 
“trend followers” [6].  
 
Fig.3a                               Fig.3b 
Fig.3  Fig.3a shows ISD1_a _1with N1=90, m 1=3. Fig.3b shows the time series of prediction accurate rates of mix-game 
with ISD1_a_1 and ISD2_a. 
 
Fig.4a                 Fig.4b 
Fig.4   Fig.4a shows ISD1_a _2 with N1=90, m1=3. Fig.4b shows the time series of prediction accurate rates of mix-game 
with ISD1_a_2 and ISD2_a. 
 
 
Fig.5a             Fig.5b 
Fig.5  Fig.5a shows ISD1_a _3 wit N1=90, m1=3. Fig.5b shows the time series of prediction accurate rates of mix-game with 
ISD1_a_3 and ISD2_a. 
However, we also find that ISD1 have influence on the accurate rate level, as shown in table 1 which shows 
the accumulated accurate rates of mix-game at 390 predicting turns with ISD2_a and three different ISD1 
(ISD1_a_1, ISD1_a_2 and ISD1_a_3). From table 1, we notice that the accumulated accurate rates are different 
with different ISD1. This implies that ISD1 can influence the level of the accumulated accurate rates. 
Table 1  Accumulated accurate rates of mix-game at 390 predicting turns with ISD2_a and three 
different ISD1. 
ISD1 ISD1_a_1 ISD1_a_2 ISD1_a_3 
Accumulated accurate rate 56.0% 54.5% 53.7% 
Table 2 shows the accumulated accurate rates with different N1, where m1=3, m2=6, N=201, T1=T2=T3=24, 
s=2, ISD1 similar to ISD1_a_1 and ISD2 similar to ISD2_a at 390 predicting turns. From table 2, we can see that 
the number of agents in group 1 greatly influences the accumulated accurate rates and the accumulated accurate 
rates increase with the increase of the number of agents in group 1. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
mix-game can simulate Shanghai Index better than MG [5]. 
Table 2  Accumulated accurate rates with different N1, where m1=3, m2=6, N=201, T1=T2=T3=24, s=2, ISD1 similar to 
ISD1_a_1 and ISD2 similar to ISD2_a at 390 predicting turns 
N1 0 10 40 90 
Accumulated accurate rate 48.0% 53.7% 55.0% 56.0% 
3.2 Agents move in their strategy spaces 
Now we look at how agents in mix-game move in their strategy spaces while we use the mix-game to predict 
Shanghai Index as shown in Fig.2. First we divide this time series into four pieces: the first piece from 0 to 126th 
time-step which has the downward tendency; the second piece from 127th to 230th time-step which is 
characteristic of two balance states; the third piece from 231st to 341st time-step which has the downward 
tendency; the 4th piece from 342nd to 415th time-steps which has the upward tendency. Then we use the method 
mentioned in section 2 to get the best ISDs for the above pieces of Shanghai Index so that we can see how agents 
move in their strategy spaces. Since the time series of prediction accurate rates is only sensitive to ISD2, we 
focus on agents in group 2 in the following discussion. 
From Fig.3b, we can see that ISD2_a has high prediction accurate rates from 60th time-step to 150th 
time-step. From Fig.6b, we observe that ISD2_b has high prediction accurate rates from 150th time-step to 200th 
time-step, and from 250th time-step to 300th time-step. Fig.7b shows that ISD2_c has high prediction accurate 
rates from 200th time-step to 250th time-step. Fig.8b shows that ISD2_d has high prediction accurate rates from 
300th time-step to 350th time-step. Therefore, we find that ISD2 changes from ISD2_a to ISD2_b, to ISD2_c, to 
ISD2_b, to ISD2_d along the time series shown in Fig.2. By analyzing ISD2_a, ISD2_b, ISD2_c and ISD2_d, we can 
notice that the distribution of agents in ISD2 changes from one point to half FSS and scatters further to whole 
FSS, then shrinks to half FSS and shrinks further. Associating the change of ISD2 with the time series shown 
Fig.2, we can find that agents tend to cluster in FSS if the real financial time series has obvious tendency 
(upward or downward), otherwise they tend to scatter in FSS and the strategies of agents are more diversified in 
balance states. This is accordance with the common knowledge about financial markets.   
 
Fig.6a                      Fig.6b 
Fig.6  Fig.6a shows ISD2_b and Fig.6b shows the corresponding time series of prediction accurate rates. 
 
Fig.7a                                Fig.7b  
   Fig.7  Fig.7a shows ISD2_c and Fig.7b shows the corresponding time series of prediction accurate rates. 
 
Fig.8a                          Fig.8b  
Fig.8 Fig.8a shows ISD2_d and Fig.8b shows the corresponding time series of prediction accurate rates. 
4. Conclusion 
We successfully introduce a method to deduce the initial strategy distributions (ISD) of multi-agent-based 
mix-game model to predict a real financial time series, and can understand what factors influence the accurate 
rates of prediction and how agents in mix-game model move in their strategy spaces by analyzing the ISDs.  
Using mix-game to predict Shanghai Index dating from 02-07-2002 to 30-12-2003, we find the time series of 
prediction accurate rates is more sensitive to ISD2 of group 2 than ISD1 of group 1, and agents in group 2 tend to 
cluster in FSS if the real financial time series has obvious tendency, otherwise they tend to scatter in FSS. We 
also find that ISD1 and the number of agents in group 1 influence the level of prediction accurate rates.  
The above results shed light on further research of agent-based prediction. We may let agents change their 
strategies during the process of prediction in order to get better prediction accurate rates by introducing generic 
algorithm into mix-game model. We may only let agents in group 2 to change their strategies because the 
prediction accurate rates are more sensitive to ISD2 of group 2 than ISD1 of group 1. 
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